Behind this controversy lurks the cosmological question of teleology (see van Woudenberg, 2004) . Is the natural world basically self-organizing, or has it been shaped by some kind of purpose? In this context Ernst Mayr (1983) created a special term to describe how a system of natural selection can appear to be solving problems actively when, in fact, it is self-organizing. The process is not purpose driven but teleonomic, meaning that individual genetic competition supports gene pools that automatically adjust their members' phenotypes to environmental change-and do so unthinkingly, even though there may be a striking appearance of ingenuity.
Mayr's position is accepted by the great majority of evolutionary scientists today, who defensively remain highly suspicious of any attempt to introduce teleological elements into evolutionary analyses. Keeping this polarization of opinion in mind, I shall examine some important patterns of purposive human decision making, to see whether they might have had a special "guidance" effect on certain aspects of the natural selection process as humans evolved socially. This question is of particular interest because a major focus in the pages that follow will be on altruistic generosity and how it could have evolved in humans, given that when social decisions become involved with natural selection processes, not only do these social decisions introduce an element of intentionality, thus providing some guidance, but in theory runaway selection could also be taking place (e.g., Fisher, 1930) .
Of course, these same scientists will readily acknowledge that modern humans, with their scientific understanding of heredity, can purposefully guide evolutionary process in some very special and insightful ways, such as genetic engineering, or, deplorably, in trying to implement policies of eugenics. But these were not part of our deep evolutionary past. It was only at the end of the Pleistocene that the intensive domestication of animals and plants first brought humans some real potency to shape the genotypes of other species under their control, and until Darwin their insights into the overall effects of these practices surely remained very limited.
Darwin grew up in proximity to livestock breeding, and there is little doubt that his precocious insights into natural selection process sprang in part from this experience as well from what he absorbed as a descriptive naturalist. In The Origin of Species, when Darwin (1859) discussed the breeding activities of farmers, he came to the conclusion that they were practicing unconscious selection. By this he meant that they were unaware of the larger effects of their selective efforts, even though their immediate, deliberate decisions about which useful variants to preserve were having an impact on the course of natural selection.
Were humans the only species to influence natural selection by making focused, purposeful decisions? Subsequently, Darwin (1871) took up the question of sexual selection in other animals. Even though they obviously are not equipped to understand either the immediate or the ultimate genetic effects of their decisions, in some species the females do instinctively choose males whose displays please the most, and the "runaway" power of such decisions as an agency of selection is remarkable (Fisher, 1930) . Indeed, secondary sexual characteristics, such as the tails of male peacocks, can evolve so decisively that they seem exaggerated in noteworthy ways that are costly to fitness. It is the highly patterned-and surely coevolvedsocial decisions of the females that hold such male traits in place.
Social selection has been discussed in a wide variety of contexts (e.g., "The Evolution of Cooking," 2002; Frank, 2005; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006; Simon, 1990; Stark, 1961; Tanaka, 1996; Wolf, Brodie, & Moore, 1999) , and sexual selection is an important subset of social selection. A number of scholars (e.g., Breden & Wade, 1991; Nesse, 2007) believe that this model can be applied not just to selection in favor of secondary sexual characteristics, but to other aspects of mate choice, including preferences that favor altruistic behavioral traits in a mate. The argument is that because such selection can rise to a runaway rate, substantial altruistic costs may be defrayed as both wiser choosers and the more altruistic individuals chosen profit from the interaction.
Here I will be examining several types of choice regularly made by human foraging bands to build the case that innate human altruism could have been supported by social choices that rewarded generous behavior at the level of phenotype. The argument will be made that a high degree of selective focus (i.e., individuals or groups deciding to reproductively reward or punish certain specific phenotypes) can transform long-running, culturally supported decision biases into a relatively powerful mechanism of natural selection. However, in contradistinction to peacock hens, with humans such decisions are far from being heavily "instinctive" or based on thoughtless imitation. In fact, our adaptively significant, cognitively sophisticated decisions may become both highly patterned culturally (see Boehm, 1978 Boehm, , 1982b and also highly collectivized (Boehm, 1991 (Boehm, , 1996 . Insofar as these decisions in fact are purposive, some "lower-level teleology" (Boehm, 1991) would seem to be creeping into the process of gene selection.
The main descriptive thrust here is to ethnographically identify certain prosocial decision biases among Pleistocene-type foragers-biases that could have resulted in strong selection in favor of altruistic generosity. However, as we examine in some detail the social biases of their small, moralistic groups, I will undertake one other discussion on the side. This has to do with group punishment's impact on human genetic nature, which also involved "guided" social selection.
Techniques of cross-cultural research will be used to explore certain highly purposeful patterns of human social preference-ones backed by moralistic sanctioning-that seem likely to have been sufficiently consistent, over enough thousands of generations, to have affected human gene pools profoundly. But first, it will be instructive to look at one very suggestive mating-selection case in which human preferences appear to have shaped a gene pool in precisely the same direction as the preferences being expressed.
Explaining Unusually Tall Serbs
In On the Origin of Species, Darwin (1859) states that humans sometimes apply unconscious selection to themselves, mentioning the ancient Greeks' choosing their wives with an eye to having healthy progeny and the Spartans' practice of culling their own children. He also mentions Prussian grenadiers, who were selected by height, noting that these exceptionally tall men had exceptionally tall wives. In addition he surmises that nonliterate people may practice some culling, as when Eskimos select dogs of a certain color for their teams.
When I was doing fieldwork with quasi-literate Serbian mountain pastoralists in Montenegro in the 1960s, I was intrigued by the fact that these "tribesmen," along with a few contiguous neighbors in Northern Albania and Southern Hercegovina, were the tallest "Caucasian" types in the world. Furthermore, they contrasted culturally with people in surrounding areas, who lacked the very prominent historical warrior ethos of these tribes (e.g., Boehm, 1983 Boehm, , 1986 , and who were significantly shorter in stature (Ehrich, 1946) . After Ehrich measured these Serbian tribesmen anthropometrically, he had no good explanation for their outstanding height aside from a guess about superior nutrition. However, in the course of 3 years' cultural fieldwork in Montenegro, I inadvertently obtained two small clues.
As a result of having a warrior society, tribal Montenegrins before 1850 were among the world's most patrifocal people (Boehm, 1983) . Accordingly, having sons to perpetuate the male family line was a major cultural preoccupation that often appeared obsessive to outsiders (e.g., Wilkinson, 1848) . The physical characteristics of progeny were also of interest, and one informant told me that sometimes parents would marry a precious son-one who was unusually short-to a very tall woman in order to have taller progeny. In addition, I had noted that being stasita (tall) was considered a desirable characteristic in brides in general.
Knowing that these pastoralists bred livestock in a purposeful way, at the time I was not surprised to hear about parents seeking tall wives for their sons. But after I left the field I began to wonder if, over time, such intentions might have affected the regional gene pool in ways unrealized by the people involved. To adequately test this unconscious-selection hypothesis, it would have been necessary to show not only that such marriage preferences existed and were acted on, but also that they were likely to have affected the fecundity of tall females compared with other women. To this end, I asked a female informant from the tribe I had lived in, Milenka Vuksanović, to make a list of men and women she knew of who were both unmarried and very unlikely to marry (see Boehm, 1991) . Although there were no certain male examples, there were almost a dozen unmarried and essentially unmarriageable females she could identify within her own fairly extensive social networks, which included perhaps a third of a tribe of 1800.
First, I asked Milenka to guess about why these women never married, and subsequently I asked her to rank them as tall, medium, or short in stature. My socially knowledgeable informant gave two reasons for a woman's failing to marry in a culture in which marriage was very much the norm. Half were "old maids" (posidjelice) who, even though they were poštena (sexually virtuous), failed to marry because they were "ugly" (grdna). The other half were "loose" women (kurve) whose premarital affairs had become known in a patriarchal society that valued female virginity and had no mercy in "talking" about women and giving them bad reputations. When the ratings for height were made, the virtuous but "ugly" females invariably turned out to be "short," whereas the women with problematic reputations appeared to follow a normal distribution for height (see Boehm, 1991) . The numbers were small and the measurements intuitive, but the patterns were certainly suggestive. None of the short-but-virtuous women had given birth, and in effect they composed a sterile caste.
Written historical information about the warlike Montenegrin Serbs suggests that the tribal-warrior syndrome, which even today distinguishes them from their neighbors, goes back at least to the times of the ancient Greeks and Romans (see Wilkinson, 1848) , so this shorter time frame would have allowed, minimally, 80 generations for this pattern of unconscious selection to have some effect. Given that radical changes in the social genotype of domesticated foxes have been accomplished in only 40 generations (Hare et al., 2005) , 80 generations might have sufficed for the Montenegrins to significantly raise their average height, particularly if runaway selection (e.g., Fisher, 1930) were operating. Unfortunately, there are no historical data for still earlier times in Montenegro, to tell us whether the pattern of being extremely warlike and patrifocal has greater historical depth, but the cultural pattern of seeking taller progeny could in fact be much older.
Indeed, Balkan people appear to have been domesticating plants and animals for at least 7,400 years (Diamond, 1997), so potentially these Montenegrins could have been applying limited insights about the hereditary transmission of traits to patrifocal marriage choices for at least 296 generations. If animal breeders can change major traits in a species within a few dozen generations when totally systematic selective breeding is being implemented, several hundred generations might well have provided sufficient time for longterm, culturally patterned biases in favor of gaining taller children to have affected the gene pool, even though only one sex was targeted for culling.
This Montenegrin hypothesis definitely involves Darwinian unconscious selection, and it is useful for thinking more generally about the influence of purposeful decision patterns on natural selection process. In this case there were perceptually obvious variations in the human phenotype, and these people already understood how to select variable traits in their animals and plants. Their conscious intention was to have taller sons, but rather than culling male progeny, they simply married all their sons to the tallest (sexually virtuous) females they could find. The outcome would have affected height in both males and females, of course, and over the evolutionary long run, this pattern of choices could have affected an entire regional breeding population.
Widening the Scope of Unconscious Selection
If one is interested in the human-evolutionary role of purposeful decisions, the obvious place to look is not at tribesmen like these, who maximally have been around for only 12,000 years (fewer than 500 generations), but at hunter-gatherers of the culturally modern type who have been making their livings in bands for nearly 50,000 years (almost 2,000 generations). Such people evolved in the Late Pleistocene (Klein, 1999) , and their direct descendants have been studied by ethnographers everywhere in the world.
These people did not practice any intensive domestication of plants, and we cannot be at all sure whether it was deliberate culling that led to the domestication of dogs at least 15,000 years ago (see Vila et al., 1997) , so we will not be looking for instances of "unconscious selection" precisely as Darwin defined it, nor will the treatment be limited to mate choice. Our potential subject matter will be any case of purposeful social decision making that affects gene pools in ways that seem consistent with the intentions of the decision makers, even if the latter are not consciously trying to manipulate hereditary outcomes at all. The type of decisions to be treated will be those involved with social control, because I believe that such behavior can be confidently projected into our human past for at least 1,800 generations (see Boehm, 1997 Boehm, , 2000 .
Natural selection proceeds at variable rates (see Eldridge, 1971 ), but Wilson (1978) has estimated that "normally" a given selection pressure must operate on a species for at least 1,000 generations to introduce a new trait. Thus, hunter-gatherers should have had sufficient time to evolve new or highly modified traits after they became culturally modern like us. However, in the case of traits selected in a highly focused way, through decisions, the time frame needed might have been less, and if runaway selection process were also in force, the time frame could have become shorter still.
Pleistocene-Appropriate Foragers
The goal here is to assess certain patterns of individual and group decision making that could have had an impact on human gene pools over the past 45,000 years, so the preliminary cross-cultural analysis will be based on extant mobile hunter-gatherers, whose socioecological patterns most closely approximate those of culturally modern foragers who lived in the Late Pleistocene. For brevity I will be calling these contemporary huntergatherers Pleistocene appropriate, and this cross-cultural sample will include only hunting-and-gathering bands that meet the following criteria:
They are mobile. Excluded are foragers who live in permanent, year-round settlements made possible by intensive food storage. Basically, they are economically independent. (This excludes fur-trade foragers, symbiotic adaptations with agriculturists, such as those of the Pygmies or the Agta, people living part-time at missions, such as the Aché, etc.)
They are "pure" hunter-gatherers. Excluded are foragers who practice domestication, such as mounted hunters in North and South America, or even those who practice a little horticulture. One exception will be the use of dogs, because dogs have been domesticated since at least about 15,000 years ago (Vila et al., 1997) , and probably earlier. Recently (Boehm, 2002) , I have informally surveyed several dozen of these Pleistocene-appropriate foragers (see also Knauft, 1991; Marlowe, 2005) , and in spite of their being adapted to an extremely wide diversity of environments (Kelly, 1995) , a number of important behavioral patterns appear to hold constant (see also Boehm, 1997) . For instance, these people invariably combine hunting and gathering, but show a preference for large game. Furthermore, there is a highly predictable ethos that makes for a strong consensus about holding down dominance behaviors that affect the entire band, and as a result they are predictably and assertively egalitarian in their political life (Boehm, 1993 ; see also Erdal & Whiten, 1994; Wiessner 1996) . There is also band-level cooperation, which is centered on sharing large game, along with strong (but not absolute) tendencies to pair-bonded monogamy (Marlowe, 2005) , a tendency to exhibit substantial homicide rates due to male competition over females (Knauft, 1991) , a strong concern for conflict resolution within the multifamily band (see Boehm, 2000; Fry, 2000) , and when a common problem is faced, a capacity of entire bands to arrive at a decision consensus in spite of having very weak leadership (Boehm, 1997) . As will be seen, their social preferences include not only a dislike of interpersonal domination and self-interested deception, but an active appreciation of those with generous traits.
By examining in some detail a cross-cultural corpus of 10 of these forager societies, I will try to pinpoint some widespread social preferences that could have had a major impact on the human behavioral genome. But first it will be necessary to describe briefly the ecological niche occupied by Late Pleistocene foragers to see how this constrained-and in effect standardized-much of their sociopolitical life.
Prehistoric Group Life
In reconstructing Late Pleistocene social life, I shall be operating on the assumption that if universals or strong central tendencies can be identified in the social behavior of Pleistocene-appropriate foragers today, these same central tendencies may be projected backward in time to apply to prehistoric humans (see Boehm, 2002) , as long as they were culturally modern, invested substantial energy in hunting large game, and for logistical reasons needed to equalize their meat distribution.
I will be basing this reconstruction on the notion of a cultural core (e.g., Steward, 1955) , which holds that environment and subsistence determine social organization (see Bettinger, 1991) . However, I have expanded Steward's concept to include also certain social and ideological factors that contribute causally to subsistence success and help to shape decision biases and influence the overall social organization. Elsewhere (Boehm, 1997) , I have described this ideologically supported core pattern in detail, calling it an egalitarian syndrome. I did so because one of its central features is for people to deliberately hold down alpha behavior-both so that meat distributions can be efficient, and, more generally, because dominance is predictably resented by egalitarian humans (Boehm, 1999) .
Large-game hunting has figured prominently in human social evolution (see Stanford 1999) . Today, with respect to vegetable foods and small game, in their bands mobile foragers basically subsist as independent families without much interfamilial sharing (Kelly, 1995) . However, to cope with the nutritionally potent large-game carcasses they strongly prefer as food, they are obliged to deal with the fact that meat takes effort to preserve, and in any event is hard to carry when camps frequently move. This means that if single families were to consume all the meat their own hunters provided, there would be the very rare feast and basically a meat famine the rest of the time.
To reduce this extreme variance in meat intake, in theory hunter-gatherers are obliged to live in multifamilial bands with at least five or six hunters, who must transfer major portions of the meat they kill to the other families (see Winterhalder, 2001; Winterhalder & Smith, 1981) . This theory is born out on the ground (see Kelly, 1995; Marlowe, 2005) , for it is the "averaging" effect of having multiple hunters share nutritious meat that makes large game such a viable subsistence item. This helps to explain a quarter of a million years of archaeological evidence for continuous large-game hunting by both archaic and modern Homo sapiens, our direct ancestors, on a number of continents (see Stanford, 1999; Stiner, 2002) . It is in the interest of keeping the analysis conservative that only culturally modern humans are being considered here.
Whereas sharing food within the family is very strongly supported by innate nepotistic tendencies, sharing among unrelated families is not (Boehm, 2004b) . And in fact, in the wider context of band-level cooperation people sometimes seem to share quite ambivalently (see Peterson, 1993 ) even though actual conflicts over meat are rare. This overt psychological ambivalence fits with the fact that band members must "police" those who would seriously take advantage of the system, and this includes not only people who might be stingy, but also bullies, laggards, cheaters, and thieves (Boehm, 1997) . A prime challenge is to keep alpha-male bullying propensities under control, so that this very important sharing system can both work equitably (Boehm, 2004c) and not be impaired by serious social conflict (Boehm, 1982a) .
In quickly surveying almost a third of the approximately 150 foraging societies I have now identified as Pleistocene appropriate (see Boehm, 2002) , the earmarks of a consistent egalitarian syndrome having these features seemed to be pervasive. And by the time that prehistoric culturally modern humans arrived, we may be reasonably certain that an egalitarian syndrome very similar to what is found today had developed. I make this assertion because, by 45,000 years ago, not only were human skeletal remains the same as today, but by then archaeological signs of cultural inventiveness and flexibility had become dramatic and "contemporary" (see Klein, 1999) , and reliance on large game was comparable to today (Stiner, 2002) .
Some Special Effects of Punishments
Today's Pleistocene-appropriate people tend to move camp about 9 times a year (see Marlowe, 2005) , and they always favor large game because it is fattier (see Cordain et al., 2000 Cordain et al., , 2002 Cordain, Watkins, & Mann, 2001) , even though vegetable foods, along with small game, so often provide the bulk of their calories (Kelly, 1995) . Decisions about where to go next sometimes are made at the family level (e.g., Palmer, Fredrickson, & Tilley, 1997) , but entire bands often make collective decisions about where to relocate, and they can make group decisions in response to social challenges as well (Boehm, 1997) .
One type of collective decision stands out in such egalitarian bands (Boehm, 2002) . When an individual departs too far from the egalitarian ethos, the entire group either turns against him and cuts him down to size, or else it simply does away with him by means of ejection from the group or through capital punishment (see Boehm, 1997) . These outcomes have reproductive consequences that ultimately can impact our gene pools, for even being ostracized can tell on reproductive success, whereas an especially aggressive male's being put to death, even at the midpoint of his reproductive career, will seriously damage his inclusive fitness.
If unusually dominant aggression has any basis in the genes carried by these political upstarts, and this seems extremely likely, then the egalitarian practice of punishing such males should be affecting gene pools-an effect that has not gone unnoticed. Trivers (1971) , in discussing the "moralistic aggression" of small human groups, took note of how genetic behavior traits making for deviance could be suppressed by severe punishment, and Otterbein (1988) has applied this insight specifically to capital punishment. Wrangham ("Evolution of Cooking," 2002) has referred to the effects of such punishment as "autodomestication," and he suggests that an originally more aggressive ancestral political nature (see Wrangham & Peterson, 1996) could have become "docilized" as a result.
I have agreed that aggressive traits would have been reduced because of punishments meted out by groups, and I also have proposed that the human capacity for "self-monitoring" (see Campbell, 1983 ) and self-control could have been augmented and transformed as a result of these special, socialselection effects (see Boehm, 1999) . The specific hypothesis is that individuals better disposed to internalize group rules, evaluate their own behavior, and hold back from deviant acts, would have had a net gain in fitness by avoiding punishment. We call the special type of self-appraisal that has evolved in conjunction with our brain's large prefrontal cortex (see Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990 ) a conscience (see Darwin, 1871) , and socially-sensitive consciences serve as internal testing grounds where individuals can think about mistakes they are likely to make and better desist from making them.
These theories about genetic effects of social punishment could help to explain the evolution of moral behavior, and the conscience-evolution hypothesis is currently under development. In this article, I will be concentrating on a different hypothesis that focuses on how altruism evolved, but again the agency of selection will be a prehistoric band expressing its predictable social preferences.
The "Sample"
My goal is to assess the likely social biases of hunter-gatherers over the past 45,000 years and, as a way of generating hypotheses for future testing, to explore the possibility that human dispositions to altruism could have been produced by totally unconscious sanctioning selection operating through social control at the group and individual levels. A cross-cultural sample of 10 extant Pleistocene-appropriate, hunter-gatherer societies will be used to do this.
This preliminary sample has not been fully randomized. At present I am constructing a large database on Pleistocene-appropriate hunter-gatherers that, when complete, will permit scholarly access to an enormous amount of published information relevant to social behavior, morals, cooperation, conflict resolution, and politics, for the scores of mobile, band-level societies of this Late Pleistocene type that have been studied ethnographically. The coding protocol is six pages long just for these types of behavior, and to date approximately 50 societies have been completely or partially coded, with the assistance of the John Templeton Foundation and the Goodall Research Center at the University of Southern California. Boehm / Evolution of Human Altruism 329 This raw, coded information has not yet been incorporated into a searchable database, but a useful portion of it can now be analyzed by hand. The societies are from all over the world, and the standard procedure is to code every ethnography in the English language for each culture that is fully processed. The eventual aim is to create an electronic multimedia database for use by scholars interested in forager behavior and human evolution, and an appropriate search-engine architecture is now beginning development.
Several dozen cultures have been fully processed now, and to conduct this pilot survey I informally selected 10 societies, partly on the basis of wanting to have a representative worldwide distribution, but also on the basis of which of the societies were fully coded and had particularly rich or abundant ethnography available. Included are Murngin and Tiwi from Australia; !Ko Bushmen from Africa; Plateau Yumans from North America; Waorani and Yahgan from South America; and four Inuit groups selected from different parts of the Arctic. Asian foragers were omitted for logistical reasons alone; the Andaman Islanders were not yet fully processed. Once I chose this list, it was final.
All of these groups qualify as Pleistocene appropriate, even though the Inuit societies relied unusually heavily on large game, and their dogs could serve as an emergency food source. Because they were obviously oversampled, I will note any possible pattern anomalies in their social preferences or antipathies, but these anomalies were few, and they will not affect the analysis.
In Table 1 it should be kept in mind that different societies were described by varying numbers of ethnographers, of varying personal and theoretical perspectives, and that there was varying descriptive quality. The table does indicate, however, how widespread a given preference or sanction or prescription was in this sample of 10 societies, and, very roughly, how emphasized a given behavior was, ethnographically speaking. Obviously, given the nature of ethnography, if an attitude or a behavior is not being mentioned for a given society, this cannot be taken as evidence that in fact it was absent.
If negative evidence must be looked at with some suspicion, for likely "universals" the positive evidence is all but indisputable. For instance, when 10 societies sampled from most world continents all report murder (see Table 1 , item 3.00) as an indigenous category of moral deviance, we may reasonably assume that were the sample size increased, murder would continue to appear on at least a very widespread basis as a specific category of deviance. Knauft's (1991) research on "simple societies" bears this out (see also Brown, 1991) . As Table 1 shows, certain prescriptions and proscriptions are so ethnographically salient that right across the board they are reported regularly and often with high frequency. Under social ideology, invariably cooperation, generosity, and sharing are preferred indigenously as desirable behaviors. Under moral deviance, all 10 societies agreed unanimously that murder, theft, adultery, taboo violation, and sorcery were undesirable behaviors, whereas the majority of societies had mentions of bullying behavior or beating someone, incest, dishonoring a female, failure to share or cooperate, and either cheating or lying, as deviant behaviors. It is likely that with less imperfect ethnographic descriptions, some of the latter would have been unanimously reported as well.
In general, oversampling the Inuit appears to have made no significant difference in the patterns that emerged. It is, in fact, exclusively the four Inuit societies that account for the four condemnatory mentions of "failure to cooperate." However, "failure to share," which may be seen as a heavily overlapping but more specific category, was mentioned 8 times, and this included 5 non-Inuit societies. If these two categories are collapsed, the overall distribution rises to 9 out of 10.
The purpose of this preliminary survey was simply to look for potentially universal or very widespread moral beliefs and practices in band life and consider them as central tendencies that might be projected into the past. With respect to practices, it is no surprise that social-control techniques also are mentioned ubiquitously: For instance, public opinion and gossiping are always reported, as is some kind of social distancing-the types running from informal social aloofness, to outright shunning or ejection from the group, to physical elimination by capital punishment. Furthermore, all but one society had shaming or ridicule mentioned, as was the case with direct criticism. In addition, all but one society mentioned either "physical punishment" or "capital punishment," as acts of social control, whereas seven specifically mentioned executions-either by the entire group or by someone acting for the group.
We now have an outline of potentially universal or very widespread moral concerns and social control practices of 10 mobile hunter-gatherer societies. It seems likely that decision biases mentioned unanimously within this small sample are likely to apply, in at least a very widespread fashion, to extant Pleistocene-appropriate societies in general, including the very few that remained in Asia. It also seems likely that empirically any pattern mentioned by, say, 70 or more of this reasonably representative sample should have quite a substantial distribution worldwide. For that reason I am including all of the above-mentioned behaviors in the central tendencies that I think can be confidently projected backward in time, as long as the culturally modern humans in question were fulfilling the socioecological criteria specified previously.
To summarize, in terms of punitive social control, this limited "sampling" provides some very strong central tendencies in values, rules, and manipulative practices that mobilize public opinion and result in criticism, ridicule, and varying degrees of ostracism or physical punishment. These practices control not only recidivist murder and bullying, but theft, cheating or failure to share, and incest and adultery. If we think about the probable long term genetic-selection effects of these group behaviors, obviously they were likely to have suppressed the frequencies of traits that prepared dominantly aggressive violence or other ways of selfishly taking away the resources of others, along with certain types of sexual misconduct.
Although bullying behavior was condemned specifically for only 7 out of 10 societies, more broadly based surveys that focused on finding highquality ethnographies (Boehm, 1993 (Boehm, , 1999 suggest that this is a widespread and probably universal concern of these mobile foragers-even though severe punitive sanctioning of serious political upstarts by outraged bands takes place rather rarely. The fact that executions of political bullies have been reported on a number of continents helps to make the case not only that humans are innately disposed to dominate other people, but that small bands of potential victims are likely to strongly oppose such behavior (Boehm, 1999) .
The Evolutionary Effects of Punishment
The argument for prehistoric negative sanctioning selection's having an impact on gene pools is easiest to make where capital punishment dramatically curtails a younger male's reproductive career, which precludes creating more progeny, and also cuts off further support of existing progeny, breeding partners, progeny's offspring, and other close relatives. Ejection from the group can also be very dangerous to the ejectee's inclusive fitness unless a safe haven is found. And within the band social distancing up to and including shunning will at least disrupt an unreformed deviant's cooperative networks (e.g., Briggs, 1970) and reduce the chances of making an advantageous marriage.
Thus, the fitness costs would have been significant for individuals unduly disposed to dominate others through physical aggression or sorcery, or for those disposed to engage in theft, cheating, or committing incest. In Boehm / Evolution of Human Altruism 335 the case of adultery, however, it is my ethnographic intuition that such behavior is widely condemned but not actively punished in many hunting bands and sometimes is even winked at. Thus I would suggest that in spite of its being morally condemned, this particular deviant behavior could be, on average, improving the individual fitness of adulterers and probably that of males in particular.
Let us return briefly to the conscience. In other hierarchical animals, individuals keep themselves out of trouble with their superiors through simple fear of punishment, which translates into individually adaptive selfcontrol and submission. The difference with humans is that we actually internalize our groups' rules (Darwin, 1871 ; see also Boyd & Richerson, 1982; Campbell, 1983 Campbell, , 1991 Gintis, 2003 Gintis, , 2004 Simon, 1990; Waddington, 1960) , and we have a sense of shame (Piers & Singer, 1971 ). This complex, cognitively sophisticated emotional reaction helps us to fully assess in advance societal reactions to our own potentially deviant behaviors-and to our prosocial behaviors-before we express them. Thus, over the past 45,000 years not only have humans become less innately prone to commit certain types of crime, but at the same time we have become much better at following rules in general. This was because punitive social selection was favoring the evolution of rule-sensitive consciences, which slowed down the expression of our deviant tendencies.
In referring to the group punishment that brought all this sanctioning selection about, I emphasize that such social processes were highly focused, insofar as just a handful of antisocial behaviors were being regularly singled out and regularly punished over dozens of millennia. It was because of this enduring and widespread cultural preoccupation with controlling certain serious deviances that people were unwittingly guiding genetic selection process in complementary directions. This can be considered a very special case of gene-culture coevolution (e.g., Durham, 1991)-special because it is possible to directly link decision biases with genetic outcomes (see Boehm, 1978) .
If we give a high probability to the hypothesis that this type of social selection has been operating for at least several thousand generations, the arguments of Trivers (1971) , and then Otterbein (1988) , Boehm (1999) , and Wrangham ("Evolution of Cooking," 2002), which suggest that our genetic nature has been modified accordingly, make excellent sense. This provides one major instance of sanctioning selection's having had an important impact on gene pools, and, because decisions were involved, it raises the interesting question of whether some type of runaway-type selection pressures (see Andersson, 1994; Fisher, 1930) may have been operating, even though sexual selection was in no way involved.
Positive Sanctioning Selection is Less Obvious
We turn now to the stubborn evolutionary problem of trying to explain innate altruism. Sociologists (e.g., Turner, 2000) define social control as having both a very obvious negative (or punitive) aspect, and also far more subtle positive manifestations. On the negative side, both entire groups and individuals acting on behalf of the group serve as manipulators or enforcers; in terms of political dynamics, often enough it is most or all of the group that is involved-for instance, when people are obliged to gang up to cope with truly dangerous deviants. In this context the type of group moralistic aggression Trivers (1971) talked about would appear to be universal among these foragers (Boehm, 2000) .
In contrast to punitive group outrage, positive sanctioning takes place more at the individual level. Although once in a while a foraging band as a whole may reward good behavior, as in consensually conferring an informal or formal leadership role on a wise, unassuming, and generous individual, the majority of social rewards would seem to come from individualized or familylevel reactions to someone's having a good reputation (see Alexander, 1987) . This takes place when a socially attractive person figures in a desirable marriage alliance or is otherwise preferred as a close partner in cooperation. The latter may come in collaborative hunting (Kelly, 1995) , in setting up trading partnerships that also provide important safe-havens in case of localized scarcity (e.g., Burch, 2005; Wiessner, 1982) , and when entire bands have to make difficult decisions about supporting band members who are incapacitated (e.g., Alexander, 1987) .
However, even though the actual payoffs to individuals mainly come from other individuals or families that show them favor, basically it is the band as a whole-as a tightly interconnected gossiping network (e.g., Haviland, 1977) -that actually arrives at these assessments of people's personal reputations (Alexander, 1987; see also Wiessner, 2005) . Thus, both negative and positive social sanctioning may be seen as results of public opinion being galvanized into group or individual action. Such opinion is based on careful mutual monitoring (e.g., Campbell, 1983) , and it is guided by decision biases that can be highly consistent over space and time, wherever human foraging groups remain very small, mobile, and independent.
In the context of positive sanctioning selection, the social ideology section at the end of Table 1 shows that the behaviors that stimulate such approval include cooperation, generosity, and sharing in general, and in all 10 societies giving aid both to kin and to nonrelatives was ethnographically mentioned at least once as being desirable. However, such social approval Boehm / Evolution of Human Altruism 337 does not imply that the actual sharing between unrelated families is devoid of ambivalence. Indeed, the aforementioned demand sharing, which involves badgering those who divide the meat to make them behave more generously (see Peterson, 1993) , is mentioned for eight societies. Curiously, the Netsilik account for 29 out of a total of 48 mentions for demand sharing, yet we know that to make their winter seal-hunting specialization work they must, in fact, share meat very effectively (see Balikci, 1970) . More generally interfamilial meat sharing, although often somewhat agonistic in its style, seems basically to be quite effective in equalizing meat consumption (see Kelly, 1995) .
Genetic Effects of Positive Sanctioning
Compared with punishment, positive social sanctioning was much less obvious, ethnographically speaking, and conceivably it was less drastic in its genetic effects, even though mate selection, as one important component, may present some special "runaway" possibilities (e.g., Breden & Wade, 1991) . The decision biases were predictable and consistent, and positive sanctioning very much favored tendencies to share and cooperate, with a specific cultural focus on generosity both within and between families.
As a matter of common sense we know that the latter, broader type of generosity does seem to come into play in human life, but basically contemporary evolutionary theory holds this to be genetically "paradoxical" (e.g., Alexander, 1987) . In essence, sociobiologists (e.g., Trivers, 1971 Trivers, , 1972 have held that, genetically, humans are capable of nepotism, which fits well with intrafamilial generosity, but does not fit with generosity between unrelated families. This theoretical stance also holds for evolutionary scholars more generally, including most evolutionary anthropologists and many others. Indeed, the evolutionary paradox of altruism that was so lucidly defined by Wilson (1975) has given rise to an enormous interdisciplinary academic industry the work of which continues strongly today precisely because the altruism-paradox challenge continues to be challenging. This seems to be the case even though multilevel selection paradigms, which include group-selection possibilities, are becoming more widely accepted (see Wilson & Wilson, 2007) .
If we consider the genetic consequences of these strong hunter-gatherer decision biases that favor generosity, it is clear in everyday life that individuals who vary genetically in the direction of being unusually generous in their responses to the needs of others-including unrelated others-will be socially favored, and their fitness will benefit. For that reason, up to a point their altruistically generous genes can be favorably selected in spite of the individual fitness costs incurred. If positive moralistic sanctioning selection becomes sufficiently robust in producing such effects, then for humans at least, there should be no evolutionary paradox.
Because for decades genetic group-selection explanations of altruism have been in doubt (e.g., Alexander, 1974 Alexander, , 1987 Trivers, 1985; Williams, 1966; Wilson, 1975) , one alternative explanation has been as follows. In a species that is innately limited to nepotism, altruistic donations to others might be supported solely at the level of phenotype. Simon (1990) suggests that being unusually culturally "docile" is extremely useful to individual reproductive success, because better culture learners gain higher fitness, and he holds that the large gains from carrying this trait can in fact be reduced somewhat because such individuals will be particularly susceptible to group messages that call for altruism. The idea is that there should still be a net fitness gain from carrying this "docility gene" because it is so very useful in other contexts. This is, in effect, a pleiotropic or "piggybacking" theory of altruism (see also Boehm, 1981) , which applies only to a highly cultural species that moralizes to get others to behave altruistically (Campbell, 1983 ; see also Alexander, 1987) .
Another way of explaining how altruistic cooperation can take place among selfishly nepotistic individuals is advocated by Boyd and Richerson (1992) . The title states the position clearly: "Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizable Groups." It follows that innate altruism is not necessary for altruistic cooperation to take place; people will cooperate simply out of immediate fear of group social pressure and reprisals (see also Bowles & Gintis, 2004) . This last explanation may not look to genes, but it is based on the same negative social forces I discussed earlier.
These everyday punitive sanctioning forces were clearly identified at the social level by Durkheim (1933) , and before him, by Maine (1861) , and the likely genetic effects of negative-sanctioning selection are, in fact, wellidentified by Trivers (1971) , Otterbein (1988) , myself (Boehm, 1999) , Wrangham ("Evolution of Cooking," 2002) , and, more by implication, by Bowles and Gintis (2004) . Thus, punishment and the threat of punishment can immediately stimulate altruistic behavior at the level of phenotype, while over many generations, at the level of genotype, this same punishment can at least reduce genetic tendencies that favor selfish deviance. What punishment cannot do, however, is to select directly for altruism at the level of genotype.
There are at least some ethnographic "hints" that positive sanctioning in favor of wider generosity itself might have some genetic basis, even though in terms of inclusive fitness it makes sense that humans should be evolved to exhort others to be more generous than oneself (see Alexander, 1987) . In surveying some hunter-gatherer prosocial activities in an attempt to find clues about whether genetically altruistic traits might underlie them, my ethnographic impression was that because people seem so susceptible to messages calling for altruism, their willingness to be generous might, in fact, have some genetic basis aside from merely being culturally docile. Likewise, the fact that small human groups so very predictably come up with prosocial messages favoring altruistic generosity could offer further indirect evidence that people actually carry some innate traits favoring altruism (Boehm 2004a) . It is at least logical that it should be much easier to persuade others to be altruistic if both parties harbored some genetic altruistic tendencies.
Of course, in theory group selection could explain such tendencies if it was strong enough. However, if we turn to positive-sanctioning selection as a parsimonious and potentially powerful model for the genetic selection of altruistically generous traits, we have an alternative that can easily work in conjunction with whatever group-selection forces may exist. The main concerns with group selection have been its apparent lack of robustness (Wilson, 1975) in conjunction with free-rider problems (Williams, 1966) . However, I have shown elsewhere that today's Pleistocene-appropriate bands are quite good at discouraging free riders, and when they fail to do so they usually can punish or eliminate them (Boehm, 1997) .
The various types of explanation discussed above are far from being incompatible, and what we are talking about here is a complex process of gene-culture coevolution that has kept cooperation around meat-sharing in place for at least 45,000 years. Thus, ultimately, positive-sanctioning selection and group selection could have been working in tandem, at the level of genotype to make humans better able to cooperate around meat. At the same time, at the level of immediate cultural dynamics, both positive and negative social sanctioning were directly supporting such cooperation on an everyday basis.
Is Runaway Sanctioning Selection Likely?
According to Andersson (1994, p. 25) , it is the escalating interactions of preferences and preferred traits that can help natural selection to reach a runaway status: Fisher (1930) suggested that "a sexual preference of a particular kind may confer a selective advantage, and therefore become established in the species." He envisaged a two-step process. Suppose there arises genetic variation in a male trait such as tail length, and that males with, say, a longer than average tail have a slight survival advantage, for example owing to improved agility. Assume also that females choose mates, and that there is genetic variation among females in their tendency to mate with males of different tail lengths. Females preferring males with long tails tend to bear sons with high survival. Hence alleles that code for longer tails in males will spread, and so will alleles that make females prefer long-tailed males, as the two types of alleles become associated in their offspring.
When this process continues, a new effect grows in importance: males with long tails are favored not only by better survival, but also by higher mating success as the preference for long tails spreads among females. The higher mating success of long-tailed males helps carry the associated alleles for the long tail and the female preference to yet higher frequency, and a feedback "runaway process" develops at accelerating pace. Although Fisher did not explain fully how this would happen, he suggested that females will prefer tails of ever-increasing length, until it finally becomes so long that higher mortality balances the mating advantage of long-tailed males. This brings the process to rest.
In defining this runaway process, Fisher (1930) concentrated on mate selection, which favored secondary sexual traits like male peacocks' tails. It was suggested that these sexual-selection pressures, generated by female choice, were so powerful that they might "carry" some noteworthy deleterious effects associated with the preferred traits. With his model, this was true up to the point that the traits became so "exaggerated" that costs began to mount up too much, as with higher vulnerabilities of the larger-tailed peacocks to predators. At that point the intensive escalating genetic interaction between the choosers and the carriers of chosen traits could go no further, and an equilibrium was reached.
What is distinctive about this runaway process is that the selection is not only social, but interactive and-up to a point-escalating. More recent runaway scenarios have been developed that focus on choosing socially attractive altruistic traits in a potential breeding partner (Breden & Wade, 1991; Nesse, 2007) , as opposed to responding to secondary sexual characteristics. The processes are similar, for if the pattern of social choice is both consistent and potent as a means of gene selection, and if both the decision makers and the individuals carrying favored traits are profiting reproductively, then the selection process might, likewise, run away, up to a point.
Of course, in humans culture is heavily involved. And in a cultural context it is not difficult to conceive how this type of selection in favor of more and more altruism might have started. All that was needed was for purposeful common sense to guide the choices of people in small bands in which personal characteristics of group members were well known because of gossiping. A wise chooser would try to ally with people who were exceptionally reliable or industrious or generous, not only in marriage but in other important types of association in which cooperation was involved. In this context a stable cultural perspective would have informed a regular pattern of decision making, and altruistic traits would have been selected positively as long as, over time, the stronger altruists, as choice magnets, were gaining a net advantage over others. However, if an individual was predisposed to behave so altruistically that the losses became greater than the gains, genes promoting that degree of altruism would not have increased in frequency and the runaway-selection process would have escalated as far as it could.
What one sees on the ground is in accordance with what this genetic model predicts. Empirically, the generosity of hunter-gatherers to genetic strangers in the same group is, in fact, obvious-but limited. Sharing within the family, which in its genetic basics is readily explained just by nepotism, is sufficiently unambivalent that it can take place strongly and without a great deal of social reinforcement. Quite predictably, extrafamilial generosity involves much more ambivalence. That is why demand-sharing patterns appear so widely and why cheaters sometimes have to be punished. However, it would be a mistake to assume that routine bickering and occasional cheating attempts mean that altruistic tendencies must be entirely absent.
With the help of moralistic messages and sanctions, this extrafamilial generosity tends to be expressed actively whenever large game are being taken sporadically on a routine basis. However, when famine arrives this system of cooperation among unrelated families is prone to collapse as selfish nepotism wins out and does so long before the intrafamilial sharing system collapses. In the rare cases in which famine reactions have been well documented for other types of humans, even intrafamilial sharing patterns can diminish or disappear if hunger becomes dire (see Laughlin & Brady, 1978) , and among Netsilik Inuit speakers, people may even resort to cannibalism within the family (Balikci, 1970) as an indigenously abhorrent alternative to sharing.
Overall, what Pleistocene-appropriate hunter-gatherers do in their groups fits quite well with a positive sanctioning-selection model that sees gene selection as being guided by decision biases that favor generosity. Individuals in their bands are innately generous enough toward nonkin to permit a culturally based system of indirect reciprocity to flourish (see Alexander, 1987) , and this does involve making donations to nonkin when exact reciprocation (Trivers, 1971) is extremely unlikely. Indeed, in such "insurance systems" (e.g., Wiessner, 1982) positive payback very often comes from a different party than the one being helped (Alexander, 1987) . At the same time, though, this remarkable generosity among nonkin is far more limited than is sharing within families. These patterns fit with a process of purposive social selection that is strong enough to support genetically altruistic traits to the point that the costs begin to get out of hand. At that point, the process can go no further.
Could All Altruistic Behavior Be Dissembled? Table 1 suggests a great deal about the likely fitness effects of punitive sanctioning, especially capital punishment, but relatively little about positive sanctioning's direct effects. This is because benefits accruing to altruists as leaders or as economic or breeding partners are not nearly as obvious ethnographically. There is also another potential problem: that of trying to differentiate helpful behavior that is "genuinely" altruistic from helpful behavior that is merely expedient because it is aimed solely at reputation enhancement. The latter has been discussed at length by Alexander (1987) , and he sees such dissembling as an evolved trait that is useful to inclusive fitness and requires no genetic altruism. In fact, he believes that all generosity toward nonkin may well be of this dissembling type.
I would agree that we are likely to have been naturally selected to dissemble generosity; for instance, the self-serving presentation of self in everyday life (see Goffman, 1959 ) is widely noted by ethnographers. However, in Alexander's (1987) opinion, the only (slim) hope for innately genuine (as opposed to dissembled) altruistic generosity's having evolved would have been strong group selection taking place in the Pleistocene through band-level warfare and group extinctions. This may be conceivable, but in that epoch frequent outright band-level extinctions due to warfare seem less than likely (see Kelly, 2000) .
More recent versions of group-selection theory do allow for significant trait-group selection in the absence of outright group extinctions (e.g., Sober & Wilson, 1998) , so in fact it is quite likely that, genetically speaking, group selection has been contributing some, and possibly significantly to our altruistic quotient. But it remains a challenge to estimate exactly how strongly such effects have operated (see Bowles, 2006) , and whether they Boehm / Evolution of Human Altruism 343 alone could account for the rather striking (if limited) degrees of altruism we see in nonliterate foragers' everyday behavior, and in our own lives.
What about dissembling, then? In my view it was obvious to group members that being seen as exceptionally generous would make others think better of them, so they put to work not only their genuinely generous impulses in this direction-but also a sly capacity to "showcase" such generous actions publicly and sometimes even to fake them. Both real and feigned generosity facilitated cooperation, for in either case the behavior was helpful to others and to a large-game subsistence. Thus, social-selection processes would have favored innate, nondissembled generosity at the same time that they were favoring a convincing capacity to showcase one's generous acts in the interest of reputation enhancement. I might add that to the extent that the choosers could make this discrimination, this social-selection process would have been biased generally toward nondissembled generosity.
The Question of Purpose
With respect to the larger picture, this exploratory treatment suggests that the phrase intelligent design should be applied to modern genetic engineering, and to it alone. However, this does not mean that all evolutionary process is teleonomic from bottom to top. When females of an animal species react favorably to the displays of certain males, they are likely to be either choosing instinctively (Darwin, 1871) or mechanically imitating the choices of other females (e.g., Dugatkin, 1992) . However, when Montenegrin Serbs arrange for their sons to marry the tallest women available, the immediate choices involve some limited insight into biological-evolutionary process. This makes the Montenegrins' choices an instance of unconscious selection as Darwin defined it.
In contrast, with both positive-and negative-sanctioning selection, the decision biases are simply aimed at improving group or individual social life, with no thought at all being given to manipulating heredity. Although this is not quite "unconscious selection" as Darwin defined it, these purposeful decision biases are, in fact, affecting gene pools in directions that are consistent with the purposes involved. Thus, the mechanisms I have been discussing might be called totally unconscious selection, in that decision biases are guiding selection process in the absence of any understanding of hereditary issues.
Although such behavior may not be limited to humans, I believe that our capacity to develop an ethos at the group level, and to deliberately sanction group members both negatively and positively, is distinctive both in the degree to which it is cultural and also in its being elaborated symbolically. The cultural symbols involved carry not only meaning but intentionality, for people in bands care about their groups and discuss how well they are functioning (see Sober & Wilson, 1998) , are quick to judge their fellows in this light, and feel empowered to actively manipulate group life.
Our main focus has been on positive-sanctioning selection, which might also be called positive social selection. This involves group attitudes about what constitutes good behavior, manipulative moralizing messages in favor of behavior that is generous or otherwise desirable, gossiping to evaluate people in this light, and, finally, the choices made by individuals, families, and entire bands that reward such behaviors. I have tried to show that a long-standing and purposeful cultural emphasis on generous behavior has affected both phenotype and genotype in very much the same direction.
This wholly unconscious selection process should have had a consistent and powerful impact on our gene pools because presumably it was so deliberate, focused, and consistent. If runaway genetic processes have been involved, the impact would have been greater still. Surely one result of all this deliberate positive sanctioning, with its possible runaway effects, has been a species that can individually showcase its altruistically-generous behaviors in a self-interested fashion. But another result has been the generous behavior, itself. It appears that such purposive sanctioning selection has had substantial effects on human gene pools, and in this light it seems expedient to take a fresh look at the altruism paradox-as well as at the types of evolutionary "causality" we are willing to talk about.
Indeed, scientific evolutionists may wish to admit some shades of grey into their analyses, with respect to "cause" and "purpose," as these are inherent in social decision processes. Exactly how to incorporate these limited purposes into the usual teleonomic explanatory mode remains a question. Could we treat decisions as an "intelligent" type of variation (e.g., Campbell, 1983) , but leave the rest of the standard paradigm unchanged? Or, for humans, is some more radical paradigmatic adjustment needed? A full exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of the present treatment. However, the complex interactions of genes and cultures that we have been discussing may provide a useful case study for further exploration.
This model involves not only gene-culture evolution (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Durham, 1991) , but a purposeful and socially sophisticated mind that, with help from symbolic communication, creates potent and highly "directional" selection forces. With respect to this coevolutionary dimension, Baldwin (1896; see also Ananth, 2005; Griffiths, 2003; Weber & Depew, 2003) made suggestions about the involvement of culturally involved developmental factors with natural selection process, which in modern terms may be considered under the rubric of epigenetic processes (see Lumsden & Wilson, 1980) , or perhaps canalization (Waddington, 1942) . In addition, niche-construction theory (Odling-Smee, 1988 ; see also Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feldman, 2001; Sterelny 2001 ) has looked to the impact of resident species on environments as well as vice versa, and in this context the decisions we have discussed help to create social-environmental effects which in turn help to determine the course of natural selection.
This case history involving positive sanctioning may be useful for testing any of these theories, and in doing so it may be beneficial to raise the question of exactly how purposive minds may be articulating with evolutionary process, overall.
Conclusions
For decades, cultural anthropology has been preoccupied with issues of cultural diversity, with relatively little attention going to universals-many of which are so obvious that we simply take them for granted. This is unfortunate because universals (e.g., Brown, 1991 ) provide a special arena in which the complex relations between cultures and gene pools can be explored. In this article, I have given certain hunter-gatherer universals some rather intensive scrutiny in the interest of seeing whether human social intentions could, in fact, have been guiding natural-selection process in ways that were significant.
In the context of both positive and negative sanctioning selection, it would appear that such "guidance" can, in effect, select in favor of genetic outcomes that might not have come about otherwise. As a product of decision biases at both group and individual levels, this limited but significant evolutionary "directionality" has provided genetic selection process with an influence that did not stem just from teleonomic selection pressures originating in natural environments-which, of course, are still the main past determinants of the content of our gene pools.
When species are highly social, this means they are constantly making choices about with whom to associate, and this results in potentially powerful social selection effects that have a strong and consistent "direction." Because humans have moral communities and individual moral reputations, it would appear that some truly unusual possibilities for social selection have arisen in our species, and that the power of such selection may be sufficient to keep certain altruistic traits in place. This would particularly be the case when selection becomes "runaway," and I have suggested that positive sanctioning selection in particular might fit quite well with Fisher's process because mate selection is involved along with economic-partner selection. Punitive sanctioning selection also may be a candidate for applying Fisher's model, even though it is aversions, rather than attractions, that are driving decision processes, and even though many of the decisions are collective, which potentially introduces another level of selection. In combination, these two types of sanctioning selection can explain a great deal about the evolution of our human capacity to cooperate.
Both methodologically and theoretically this article has been exploratory. Yet I would suggest that human social intentions, expressed in the form of group and individual decisions, can impinge significantly on the process of gene selection. They can do so to a degree not expectable in any animal that lacks purposeful, morally catalyzed social control. The reduction of antisocial traits and the evolution of a conscience are two very likely results, whereas the positive social-selection hypothesis we have concentrated on can explain something very important about altruism's evolutionary underpinnings.
This hypothesis requires some further development with more extensive and more rigorous ethnographic coverage combined with appropriate mathematical modeling and simulation testing. However, such exploration should be worthwhile, simply because human altruism and altruistic cooperation remain provocative and sometimes contentious evolutionary issues. It would also be useful because socially rewarding altruists provides such a good example of how natural selection might be driven by long-standing decision biases, largely shaped by group mores, which were also modifying behavioral dispositions in similar directions-even though they were directed at phenotypic behavior. If this type of lower level teleology is, in fact, making a significant difference for selection outcomes, I believe this to be more than just a question for the philosophers.
